Tuesday, March 30, 2010

The Gmail Effect?

When Gmail first hit, it was not for everyone. If you can remember back that far, to get a Gmail account you first had to be invited by a Gmailing friend, who was - at least for the moment - cooler than you. I was too cool to ask for an invite, but I wanted one, just because... well... I couldn't get one.

Marketers have always known that exclusivity (and its sister, scarcity) are powerful tools. What we can easily get we may not want - but what's doled out to the few and lucky (whether by connections or pricey tags) has this sudden allure.

Policy makers rarely stoop to such manipulative levels - but they should do so more often. I suspect Arnie Duncan had marketing in mind when the Education Department decided, as reported in today's Washington Post, to grant just two Race to the Top awards. Delaware and Tennessee will be turning their education systems inside out for a small bucket of cash - and they're proud of it. But when 50 states were told they had to do the same under No Child Left Behind, there was revolution in school superintendents' offices across the nation. The difference? Maybe Delaware and Tennessee were happy with NCLB too (I don't know for sure, but my guess is not). More likely Delaware and Tennessee are happier with Race to the Top and for two reasons: because they had more room to innovate their own ideas and because they get the "exclusive" pot o' money.

Could it be that by making reform exclusive, Duncan will make states suddenly hot to reform - where they once were cool?

Saturday, February 20, 2010

Reading a review of Timothy Ferris' "The Science of Liberty" - which argues both that liberty has a debt to the scientific method and that science provides a model for democracy - and I'm brought back to that age old question "where did the West get this notion of liberty in the first place?"

Did our belief in the scientific method (the idea that truth could be gotten at through experimentation) contribute to the notion that we all might have something important to say or to add to conversation? It seems that notion had broader, unscientific, roots. Martin Luther, most notably, was a non-scientific-method advocate for the individual's ability to think for himself. And the idea that each of us can think for ourselves seems, to me, to be the root of individual liberty.

But still the question lingers - why did the pre-eminence of the individual thinker (and actor) rise in the West? Robert Wright made an argument in Nonzero that what set the West on a separate trajectory from the East was the happenstance of power being divided between the church (Rome) and the state (France, Prussia, etc.) - whereas the norm everywhere else was to have the state and church (or whatever spiritual cosmology was practiced) one and the same. I wonder if it was merely this split - and that individuals had to think for themselves to reconcile the differences between the Pope and the King - that sprouted the idea that the individual and his thoughts were to be valued and respected. If the powers that be can't figure things out for us and we have to think for ourselves, by george, let us think for ourselves. Voila, liberte.


Sunday, January 31, 2010

a democratic paradox

Just a quick observation that leads to a bunch of questions:

We, as citizens, trust our elected officials less than we trust, well, pretty much anyone else - appointed judges, the military, even the media.

There's a fundamental paradox there; the people we choose ourselves (and presumable have the most control over) are the people we trust least. Is that because we feel betrayed when they don't act the way we'd like them to? Is there a pragmatic instinct inside of us that makes us content with things we can't control and frustrated with what we can? Or is it simply that we see and hear a lot more from our politicians - and getting to know anyone in power, particularly those cow-towing to us, means getting to dislike them.

Sunday, November 22, 2009

Are citizen participation and deliberative democracy at odds?

I never thought I'd ask the question. Indeed, I never thought the question existed. But are citizen participation and deliberative democracy at odds?

The two, in my mind at least, seemed to go hand in hand; with greater citizen involvement in the democratic process, the more discussion and deliberation would be need to make decisions.

But a (fantastic) article I'm in the middle of reading (pdf), suggests the opposite: that the more you cushion decisions from the democratic process, the more potential there is to demand deliberative decisions. Huh.

I'm not sure, but I think the logic is thus: democratically made decisions risk happening at the whim of an impassioned electorate or wily politicians (not necessarily working in the best interest of the nation, but decisions made by institutions a step away from politics - courts, the Federal Reserve, etc - can have the space to dis-impassionedly think through the complexities of an issue.

The key here is who gets to be deliberative. In this view, citizens are out of the process - and the wonks in the institutions are in. I'm assuming that two caveats are implied. One, that the semi-independent agencies have to be public with their thinking process and that, by extension, if they're really unconvincing that that a public backlash could get them to backtrack.

Monday, October 12, 2009

Yesterday I spouted off loosely about some behavioral economic (a mix of economics and psych) ideas, but I didn't mention where I'm picking them up. They are being gleaned from a course I'm auditing at Harvard, taught by Sendhil Mullainathan, who would probably cringe to know how I'm bastardizing (aka dumbing down) the theories of minds miles greater and more subtly nuanced than mine. Let's just hope he's not reading.

The particular concept I was writing about - that we tend to stick to our beliefs by spinning new information in a way that reinforces those beliefs - is related to a very cool concept that Sendhil was talking about a couple weeks ago. It's so cool, it's worth mucking up again from my memory.

Turns out our propensity to stick to our guns may not just be a self-serving, ego-stroking mechanism to make us feel good. It could be that it's just a by-product of a couple of logical flaws - or "biases," as the behavioral economist term them - that we humans have.

Here's the bias in question: we like to see patterns. Or to be more precise, we like to see information we know about the big picture show up in the little picture.

Here's an example: If you were asked - out of all the families that had five kids in the US, what percentage had them in this pattern - BGGBG - vs - GGGGG - you'd probably say the first pattern was more frequent than the second (as does almost everyone who's asked this question). A professional statistician, however, would tell you that both patterns are equally probable - and they'd be right. The reason you (and I) would guess the BGGBG pattern is because, well, we know that there are about 50/50 girls to boys and so it's just really, really weird to see 100% girls in one family. That's because you and I make the error of thinking just because the odds of something happening in an entire population are 50/50, those same odds should exist in a small sample (they don't). If you really wanted to test this theory out, you could flip a coin a few thousand times and see that any string of five flips (say, HTTHT) is no more likely than another (like HHHHH).

One place this bias shows up is in something called "the gambler's fallacy." If I ask you to bet on the flip of coin, it's 50/50 whether you'd bet heads or tails, right? But if we do a few rounds of coin tosses, and heads came up three times in a row, what would you be would be the next toss? Tails, right? (Be honest.) You, like 99% of humanity, think "Well, I know that half of all coin tosses turn up heads and half tails, if I've seen a lot of heads, a tails has to turn up soon, right?" Wrong. It's the same bias as above - we think the fact of 50% heads showing up should be seen in small samples as well as large samples. Again, it ain't the way it happens.

But there's another bias gamblers have which seems to be the opposite of the gambler's fallacy. This theory has it's own special name too: the "hot hand." Like it's name suggests, the "hot hand" says that gamblers will often get under the illusion that they are on a roll, having a lucky streak. If we were still playing our coin toss game and you kept seeing heads, you might begin to think - "okay, let's keep putting our money on heads." How can this be so? How can a gambler go from having a bias of thinking that the winds have got to shift to thinking their wave is going to ride out forever?

The two biases aren't as contradictory as they seem. In fact, they could different manifestations of the same bias. The difference is only in the pattern that the gambler expects to see. If he's looking for the pattern of HTHTHT, he'll have the gambler's fallacy. If thinking he's on a roll of HHHH... he'll get a hot hand. The interesting question is when and how he'll make the switch from one to the other? Behavioral economists seem to believe that we'll stick with our expectations for one pattern a long time, long past evidence shows up our expectations are way off. When the evidence builds up to a breaking point, though, we'll finally give up on our bias. Sadly, though, as the gambler suggests, we just jump to another set of expectations that are likely to be equally false.

That brings us back to yesterday's post. It's not just at the roulette table that we are this irrational. It's probably the case in our everyday beliefs. If we know something to be "true," we'll keep expecting (and looking for) evidence that supports our belief. It'll take a large heap of contradictory evidence (hurled at us successfully at high speeds) in order to unhook us from our beliefs. And when we finally snap out of it? Well, we just find a new belief - and pattern - to look for and, of course, continue to see.

Sunday, October 11, 2009


A loooong time in posting. So long, in fact, I am surprised that I managed to find my way back to this blog (thank you blogger.com for remembering me).

Kool-Aid Konfidential thoughts have been swilling in my head since last post eight months ago, but job searching, grad school applying and and other lame excusing has kept me from putting thoughts to text box. Instead, I've fulfilled my proselytizing urges with overly-eager responses to friends' emails and, worse, Facebook status updates. I return here to relieve my friends of future unsolicitated spoutings.

Today, I am desisting from responding to one such FB thread. Friend Andrew posted a clever image (above) from my new favorite blog simplecomplexity.com, and people got thinking: is this really how information and confusion dance together.

At first glance, it looks about right. Take health care spending. With no information about how our health care system works (or fails to work), one would be expected to be completely at a loss on how bring down runaway spending. Then you get some information: your friend gives you a convincing explanation of, say, defensive medicine and you say, aha! I know how to fix health care: cap medical malpractice suits. Great, no confusion. But then another friend tells you, no, no, no, medical malpractice suits aren't the problem, it's the fact that doctors are incentivized to do more procedures, not necessarily just cure illness. Sounds good, but so now who is right? We are back to confusion. Finally, consider you have a lot of other clever friends who have other likely explanations; that just means you'll get more and more confused.

Of course, Andrew's curve suggests a macro view of this micro example. Considering we aren't just concerned with one question (like health care policy) but have other concerns (the right diet, where to send our kids to kindergarten, what's the meaning of life) we can see there are lots of opportunities to get bewildered.

But, yet, we don't all walk around in a daze of confusion. Is that because we all stopped at "a little learning" and are not taking in new information?

The work of behavioral economists suggests so. It's not exactly the case that we stop taking information in, though; rather we are selective about the information we absorb and how we absorb it. We all have self-serving biases that either make us hear only what we want to hear -or, when a bit of unappealing information slaps us in the face, spinning it to our good fortune.

There comes a time, however, when we get hit with so much information that contradicts our view that we break out of our certainty. What happens then? Do we become open minded? Do we live in uncertainty and confusion, now having learned that hard-held views can be wrong? Unfortunately (or fortunately) no; instead of hanging out in the unknown, we wend our way back to certainty - but this time with our new viewpoint. This can go on for a while, getting us - what I think is - our real confusion curve:


Thursday, December 18, 2008

The Upside of Human Nature

When asking the question "are humans cracked up for democracy?" at least part of the answer has to be, well, yes. After all, we invented the stuff and - for the most part over the past century - democracies have done better for themselves than their totalitarian counterparts.*

With all of our anti-democratic tendencies (to be discussed later in this blog, I promise), humans also have our fair share of innate behaviors that lend themselves to democratic behavior.

Altruism. Like almost every other non-bacterial species on earth, humans are by nature altruistic. We are neither rocks nor islands. We frequently give to others when there is no direct benefit for us - and we enjoy the sensation of giving. What's up with that? There are a couple of levels at which humans are naturally nice to others, at the most basic level - "kin altruism," at least as behavioral biologists understand it - there is a clear evolutionary reason.

The idea behind kin altruism is simple: when I sacrifice something to help my sister, son, niece or cousin it actually helps me - or, at least my genes.

To understand, we have to take a step back to get a handle on evolutionary theory. You've heard of "survival of the fittest," the idea that evolution works by winnowing out those of us not really good at surviving life's rat race and leaving behind those who win the survival game. But to really grasp evolution, it's important to understand what "survival" means. Whether or not you survive until a ripe old age of 100 is irrelevant; what matters is whether you - or, to be specific - your genes survive, in the form of children, grandchildren, etc.

You are probably familiar with the idea of the "selfish gene" - the concept that evolution is really just a way for genes to get themselves replicated. This theory has been largely maligned - often with good cause - because it's been distorted in understanding human evolution, but the core concept is apt. Genes that are good at increasing your "reproductive success" will tend to proliferate in a population. Genes that cut off your chance of having lots of kids and grandkids will tend to disappear.

(By the way, evolutionary theory sometimes gets a bad rap because there's an idea that genes "strategize" on how to proliferate. Obviously, that's not what happens; there's no thinking in evolution, instead every once in a while genes accidentally "mutate." If you're a cavelady and you get a mutation that gives you super-strengthening breast milk, that mutation might spread after a few generations; if, however, you get a mutation that dries up your breast milk, chances are that mutation will die out pretty fast.)

You don't have to be a parent to know that moms and dads have some pretty strong instincts to sacrifice for their children (or, in some of my friends' cases, have the lifeblood sucked out of them). But we also make sacrifices for our siblings, nieces, nephews, parents and cousins; that's because just as our genes are in our children, they also are in our blood relatives.

I'm a single gal, but - in an evolutionary context - I actually have the equivalent of 2.75 children in the form of my nine "blood" nieces and nephews; that is, those nine nieces and nephews have the same amount of my DNA as would almost three of my own children (imaginary, for now). It's not surprising that I have maternal feelings towards them, particularly the two daughters of my one full brother. That makes sense - if I put the same energy into insuring that my two nieces grow up into healthy women, my genes get as much benefit as if I had raised a daughter of my own. (For those curious about my math: if I had a child, she would share 50% of my DNA. My brother also has 50% of my DNA, so his daughters each have 25% of my genes. 25% + 25% = 50%.

More on our democratic instincts in later posts...

*This statement is generally more true for wealthy democracies. As Fareed Zakaria, among others, has pointed out - democracies tend to work when there is a foundation of civil society and individual liberty that often comes with a strong middle class and wealth. In poorer countries, democracy can often lead to instability and, paradoxically, repression.